On the Path to Liberating Public Life, Not Just Military Headquarters

In a moment of deep despair, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, the leader and founder of the Justice and Equality Movement, launched “Operation Long Arm” to invade Omdurman. He likely knew that his gamble would ultimately crash against the political and military realities of the Sudanese regime. Yet, the operation was necessary. Since the “Torit Mutiny,” as Sudanese political literature refers to it, Khartoum had never faced a full-scale military invasion. For decades, as the capital, it had exported systematic violence to the rest of Sudan while enjoying its own fragile peace.

Throughout its history, Khartoum has been taken by force only twice: first by the Mahdist forces and later by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023, when the Islamists launched a preemptive war to eliminate the RSF and the framework agreement. Dr. Khalil’s “Operation Long Arm” could be classified as a security disruption—similar to the 1976 “mercenary operation” led by the National Front—rather than a full-fledged military engagement like the war of 2023.

Later, when Dr. Khalil met his heroic fate in the Wad Banda area of Kordofan, celebrations erupted among some members of the Kababish tribe in Hamrat Al-Sheikh. I was there, working on a documentary for Al Jazeera, when I heard a folk song mocking his death. The chant reduced Dr. Khalil to a mere “slave,” stripping him of his political and military identity.

Our friend, the political analyst Mohamed Al-Mabrouk, who hails from the Kababish region, describes the soon-to-be-formed government as the “Dagalo-Taaishi separatist government”—referring to Mohamed Hassan Al-Taaishi, not the historical Khalifa Al-Taaishi. He argues that “northern elites will find themselves in unfamiliar territory” and will eventually retreat to the so-called “embrace of the homeland.”

Al-Mabrouk, however, has not presented any concrete evidence of separatist intentions within the new government. There are no official documents suggesting such an agenda, nor has self-determination been a formal part of the current conflict. But the entrenched political mindset of Sudan’s ruling elite, inherited since independence, continues to categorize any political movement outside their control as “rebellious, regionalist, tribal, or separatist.” Analysts are often forced into using these ready-made labels rather than conducting genuine research.

Had Al-Mabrouk taken a moment to reflect, he might have noticed that since April 2023, even the Kababish heartland—let alone the remote areas of Kordofan and Darfur—has not been under any central government authority. The so-called Burhan government has no real presence in these areas, which are instead governed by traditional tribal leaders and RSF forces. Does this not warrant the formation of a government, and urgently so?

Can Al-Mabrouk, a sharp-minded observer, truly fail to see the fundamental shift in Sudan’s political and military landscape?

For nearly two years, Army Chief Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan has been unable to return to his office at the General Command, nor can he enter the Republican Palace. The ongoing war since April 2023 represents a complete transformation in Sudan’s historical conflicts. Yet, the military leadership remains oblivious, clinging to the outdated belief that it still knows how to fight wars better than anyone else. This misconception will ultimately lead to its downfall.

Similarly, Sudan’s old political elite—whether Islamists or members of the traditional ruling circles—have failed to grasp that they no longer control the game. They continue to operate under outdated rules, which is what led to the split within “Taqaddum” (Progress). This division is not about “northerners versus westerners,” as some claim, but rather about the failure to recognize that Sudan’s political equation has fundamentally changed.

A government will be formed.

Yes.

And it will be recognized by most of Sudan’s neighbors, the majority of African states, the European Union, and several other global powers. Can anyone seriously argue that Burhan’s government has any legitimacy? That debate would be purely academic.

The urgent reality is that someone must take action to halt the relentless airstrikes by Burhan’s forces on Sudanese towns and villages, including Hamrat Al-Sheikh. Someone must step forward to ensure that all Sudanese citizens have access to official identification documents—not as a favor from Burhan or anyone else, but as a fundamental right.

The illusion of a Sudanese government bound by rigid territorial control will gradually fade. As the rules of political engagement change, so too will the dynamics of war. This is not the war of South Sudan, nor that of Abdel Wahid, Minni Minnawi, or Khalil Ibrahim.

History moves forward.

And the same old tactics will not work this time.

The so-called “Dagalo-Taaishi government” is not a separatist project.

Time will reveal the truth.