Al-Burhan Shifts the Conflict from Military to Political: A Calculated Move or Desperation?

As the war in Sudan drags on, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appears to be steering the conflict away from direct military engagement toward a political battleground—a strategy he has employed before to serve his objectives by “reshuffling the deck.”

International efforts to stabilize Sudan have consistently emphasized the need to remove Islamist factions from the political equation. Al-Burhan’s latest move signals his acceptance of this direction, as confirmed in his speech—a clear message to the international community that he is willing to comply.

Islamist Reaction: Denial and Shock

As expected, the remnants of Sudan’s former Islamist regime have been caught off guard. Their delayed response has been one of outrage and lamentation, despite their own role in igniting the war, destroying the country, and now, paradoxically, hoping for a return to power.

Their frustration is evident following Al-Burhan’s speech, in which he effectively distanced himself from them, abandoning his Islamist allies in an attempt to secure his own survival. However, they seem to overlook the fact that they themselves instigated the war, yet still dream of political dominance.

A Dangerous Political Gamble

Al-Burhan’s decision to withdraw the military’s protection from the Islamists leaves them exposed on the battlefield. His timing is especially perilous, as the war is far from over. This means that both domestic and international actors could now legitimately target them, given that the battlefield is no longer under the army’s direct control.

The Islamists’ reaction further exposes the reality that their participation in the war was not about defending Sudan or its people, but rather about seizing power. While they claim to have fought alongside the military, the truth is that it was the army that fought alongside them—a distinction they now fail to acknowledge.

Al-Burhan’s Political Survival Strategy

If Al-Burhan were truly winning the war, he would have already returned to Khartoum from Port Sudan, declared victory, and formed a government. But instead, he is prioritizing political maneuvering while the war still rages on. This suggests that his latest speech is not about genuine political reform, but rather a signal to the international community that he is willing to negotiate and make concessions—even if that means sacrificing his former Islamist allies.

His message is clear: “I am ready to strike any deal necessary to eliminate the Islamists—just give me a way out.” However, the world has moved beyond Al-Burhan and his Islamist backers.

The Flawed Logic of Political Reconciliation

In war, the victor does not seek political compromise—especially not with adversaries. If Al-Burhan’s goal was truly military victory, why did he wage war against political forces only to seek reconciliation with them later? Would it make sense to return to the very starting point of the conflict?

If he is indeed serious about restoring civilian democratic rule, then he must first withdraw the legal accusations that Islamists and their allies have leveled against Sudan’s political opposition. These accusations were never about justice, but rather about undermining opposition forces.

Al-Burhan’s insistence that these groups publicly distance themselves from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is not a genuine security concern—it is simply an excuse to cover up his own retreat.

Al-Burhan’s Delusions of Exemption

Perhaps the most ironic aspect of Al-Burhan’s strategy is his belief that everyone but himself should be removed from power. However, if the very factors that disqualify Islamists and other factions from governance apply, then he too should be excluded.

The proposed technocratic government—guided by an interim constitution, a representative parliament, and a single, professional army—was designed to eliminate both Islamists and military figures from governance, in favor of an independent, nationally respected leader.

So, what exactly has the war achieved for those who opposed civilian rule? Nothing but destruction. They have:

• Killed 160,000 civilians,

• Displaced 7 million people,

• Reduced the country to ruins.

Final Thought: No to War, No to Amnesty

Forgiveness cannot be granted by those whose hands are stained with blood to those with clean hands. The accusations leveled against Sudan’s civilian forces must be proven before the Sudanese people—if they cannot be, then the accusers themselves should be held accountable.

Accepting amnesty from Al-Burhan would be an admission of guilt. But in reality, it is he who should be seeking forgiveness—not offering it.